Carbon taxation in France: a failure compared with experience elsewhere in Europe? The case of road freight transport by Harnay, Pétronille & Harnay, Pôl-Vincent
Carbon taxation in France: a failure compared with
experience elsewhere in Europe? The case of road
freight transport
Pe´tronille Harnay, Poˆl-Vincent Harnay
To cite this version:
Pe´tronille Harnay, Poˆl-Vincent Harnay. Carbon taxation in France: a failure compared with
experience elsewhere in Europe? The case of road freight transport. European Transport
Research Review, Springer Verlag, 2012, 4 (4), pp.201-215. <10.1007/s12544-012-0079-4>.
<hal-01314897>
HAL Id: hal-01314897
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01314897
Submitted on 3 Oct 2016
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
1 
 
Pétronille Harnay 
Pôl-Vincent Harnay 
Ifsttar/Splott 
Petronille.reme-harnay@ifsttar.fr 
 
 
Carbon taxation in France: a failure compared with experience elsewhere in Europe? 
The case of road freight transport 
 
According to CDC Climate research, “the amount of carbon absorbed [by the atmosphere] has 
increased by almost 30% compared to the pre-industrial era” ([7], p 4). This has led to an increase in 
average global temperature of approximately 1°C over a century (with a large number of extreme weather 
events, the pollution peaks that have occurred in cities all over the world, and numerous incidents of oil 
dumping which destroy marine fauna). These challenges are gradually leading global institutions, at 
European and national levels in particular, to make ambitious commitments to reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions.  
During the Cancun conference in December 2010, international climate negotiations, based on 
the founding text that consists of the United Nations framework agreement on climate change which was 
signed in Rio in 19921, validated the continuation and extension of the use of the market tools that were 
set up by the Kyoto Protocol, without deciding on a precise modus operandi after 20132. The Kyoto 
Protocol, which was signed in 1997, for the first time committed 39 developed countries to reducing their 
greenhouse gas emissions between 2008 and 2012 by 5% compared with the 1990 baseline. The 
European Commission introduced a community quota trading system as the principle means of achieving 
this goal. 
It is, of course, true that the Cancun negotiations confirmed the recent realization by developing 
countries of the severity of climate risk and the Obama administration’s determination to find ways to 
combat emissions. But the fact that emissions continue to rise in many countries and the undemanding 
agreements that were signed at the Copenhagen and Cancun conferences show that much still remains to 
be done.  
At a strictly European level, the community quota trading system is symbolic of the battle 
against CO2 emissions. In practice, however, it is not without its disadvantages. It could be effective in 
the case of electricity production, which is a concentrated sector with a small number of large companies, 
but for other sectors, such as road freight transport where there are a large number of predominantly small 
actors, taxation is more effective. Furthermore, as Roger Guesnerie has pointed out, if firms prefer the 
quotas to taxation, it is because it is easier to negotiate some free quotas than an exemption from taxation 
(particularly if the tax is paid in advance). This economist has stated that it was largely through chance 
that a quota market was chosen in preference to taxation and given a list of reasons why a harmonized 
carbon tax should have been preferred to a quota system, one argument being that in the case of the latter 
markets are more sensitive to speculation [13]. The financial and economic crisis has confirmed 
Guesnerie’s point of view, and make one inclined to prefer a carbon tax.  
Several European countries, namely Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom3 have 
already experimented with a carbon emissions tax. France was engaged on this path and was due to 
                                                          
1which recognized the principles of precaution, of common but differentiated responsibility, and the right 
to economic development. 
2 This conference also ratified the Copenhagen Accord signed in 2009 by a sub-group of 28 heads of state 
outside the framework convention. In particular, this accord made a distinction between developed and 
developing countries. 
3The Climate Change Levy is more of an energy tax than a carbon tax. 
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introduce the so-called Climate and Energy Tax (Contribution Climat-Energie - CCE), in its draft budget 
for 2010, but however drew back.  
This paper will consider the basis and consequences of this French decision, which we will compare to 
the example set by the success of other European countries, such as Sweden. Initially, the CCE was liable 
to be revised after it was criticized by the Constitutional Council on the grounds that it contained too 
many exemptions, and it was finally withdrawn by the French government. The Prime Minister justified 
this on the grounds that “a decision must be taken jointly with the other countries of Europe or our 
competitiveness deficit will be increased further” (quoted in Le Monde on 24 March 2010).  
In what follows we shall examine this justification and the withdrawal of the carbon tax in France. Should 
the tax have been saved or was it right to abandon the idea? The example of road freight transport, which 
crystallizes the debate about policies to combat carbon emissions, will provide us with some answers to 
these questions.  
In Section 1 we will demonstrate that the French draft act, which came to nothing, was perhaps poorly 
constructed and less ambitious compared to legislation elsewhere in Europe.  
Section 2 will focus on the reasons for the withdrawal of the carbon tax, namely that it would make firms 
less competitive. In order to examine this idea we will consider the road haulage industry, which is one of 
the sectors of industry that generates the most pollution.  
While it is very difficult to obtain separate data on the European road haulage industry, we do know that 
transport as a whole accounted for 23.3% of CO2 emissions in the EU in 2008 according to the European 
Environment Agency (June 2010), which puts it in second place after electricity production (32.1%), 
which is covered by the quota market.  
This percentage is even higher in France, where transport is responsible for 33.2% of CO2 emissions. 
Moreover, the road freight transport sector was specifically targeted by the CCE which subjected it to a 
double tax.  
 
1. A proposal that came to nothing  
 
In order to shed light on the form the carbon tax took for road freight transport in the 2010 draft budget 
and the problems which it raised, we will need to look at the draft legislation as a whole.  
Although there is a community system of quotas, the Kyoto goals differ from one country to another. 
France, for example, is committed to achieving 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012 while Sweden hopes 
to achieve a four percentage point reduction. 
Likewise, there are many points of difference between the draft legislation for the French carbon tax and 
the carbon taxes that exist in the rest of Europe. In our view, the French draft legislation is less attractive 
than the taxes that have been introduced in Sweden and Denmark, for example, which are part of a more 
comprehensive system of environmental taxation. This is no doubt part of the reason for the withdrawal 
of the French proposal.  
Our purpose in comparing the French proposal for a carbon tax with European carbon taxes is to reveal 
the different ends pursued when developing carbon taxation.  
The French preparatory report that dealt with the carbon tax (the report of the Conference of Experts and 
the Climate and Energy Tax Roundtable, chaired by Michel Rocard in 2009), stated that France should 
follow the example of Sweden, which it described using such terms as “reference”, “successful example” 
and “positive verdict” ([26], p.6,45,75). 
In 1991, after several years of consideration, Sweden introduced a tax on carbon emissions. According to 
the Swedish Environmental Protection Agency, “the most obvious effect of the carbon tax has been an 
increased use of biomass boilers in the Swedish district heating system” ([17] p.7). The effect continued 
with “the development of the methods of biomass extraction” (idem, p. 11). Apart from the incentive to 
use alternative energies, the Swedish Ministry has stated that in 1995 CO2 emissions were 15% lower 
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than they would have been with no tax reform and estimated the reduction for 2000 at 20-25%. It is easy 
to see why Sweden was used as a reference during the years of consideration which preceded the French 
CCE. Denmark, Finland, the United Kingdom and Germany, which have pursued the same policy, also 
each provide grounds for introducing a carbon emissions tax. 
Furthermore, the Rocard report, which was commissioned by the French government to prepare the CCE 
explained that “in the absence of new measures, primary energy consumption in France will increase by 
approximately 0.8% per year in the period 2006-2020, while it would fall by 0.3% per year if the first 
measures advocated by the Grenelle Environment Summit were to be implemented”[26]. 
But the proposals made by these experts, who attempted to measure the possible economic and social 
impacts of the new taxation, its environmental benefits (1.2) and optimum level (1.1), were considerably 
diluted in the 2010 draft budget. In addition, that part of the law that dealt with the road haulage sector 
seems curiously constructed (1.3). 
 
1.1. The conditions that apply to the level of the carbon tax 
The carbon tax, which is defined in the Rocard Report as a price signal sent to firms and households, is a 
Pigouvian tax that maximizes collective well-being by ensuring that pollution is paid for at the marginal 
cost of the damage it inflicts on society.  
To pave the way for the carbon tax France, the Quinet Commission [25] attempted to determine the value 
of carbon and the Rocard Commission proposed that the solutions that were the most advantageous for 
France should be adopted. The work of these commissions was based on the use of macroeconomic 
simulation models and European examples such as Denmark and Sweden which were given reference 
status.  
When asked to specify the price of a tonne of carbon, the Quinet Commission proposed what they 
referred to as an administrative value, on the grounds that the recommended monetary value was not 
derived directly from observations of market prices but resulted from a government decision based on a 
concerted evaluation of French and European commitment to combating climate change. The 
administrative value of carbon was defined on the basis of a long-term cost-effectiveness analysis which 
took account of the discounting rate [25]. More precisely, it would be fixed at €100 per tonne in 2030 and 
as a result of an annual rate of increase of 4% would increase to €200 in 2050. This gives a starting value 
of €45 in 2010. “However, on the grounds of acceptability and continuity with previous decisions, the 
Quinet Commission finally proposed the lower value of €32. Based on the latter value, the CCE applied 
to the previously-adopted tax base would have generated tax revenues of €8.3 billion in 2007, 4.3 billion 
of which would be obtained from households (i.e. 0.7% of their average consumption budget) and 
approximately €3.75 billion from firms (i.e. 1% of their added value in the case of industry and 1.7% in 
the case of transport)” ([26], p. 25). 
In spite of the experts’ forecasts, the French government set the tax at €17. However, according to the 
Rocard Commission: “starting at a level of €32 per tonne of CO2 on the grounds of acceptability would 
probably not cast doubt on the credibility of this commitment. But this would not be the case if the 
starting level was too far below this, as the credibility of raising its level to an appropriate level in the 
medium term would be doubtful” ([26] ,p. 63). 
This has been confirmed by CIRED (International Environment and Development Research Group) 
which built models to simulate the impact of the tax. Their forecasts have shown that in the case of a tax 
of about €20, whatever system was selected, the situation with regard to jobs and total consumption 
would deteriorate, increasing the net deficit in the public accounts, which would remove any margin of 
manoeuvre for financing accompanying measures and even make it necessary to reduce social transfers 
[5].  
In Sweden, the tax was initially fixed at €27 per tonne, and then gradually increased to €101 in 2007. 
Sweden was therefore in line with the recommendations of the French experts. France could therefore be 
criticized for failing to follow this example, but it should not be forgotten that Sweden is an exceptional 
case in this regard. Most of the European countries that had already introduced a carbon tax had also 
favoured acceptability and set the tax at relatively low levels compared to that recommended by the 
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Quinet and Rocard Commissions. Thus, as shown in Table 1, the starting rate of the Finnish tax was €1.2 
in 1990, rising to €20 today. The average level of the tax was €12.5 in Denmark. The only countries that 
comply with the ideal level are Norway (with a level of approximately €50) and Sweden (currently €108). 
Sweden is the only European country that increases its carbon tax every year, the idea being gradually to 
replace taxes that pertain to work with environmental taxes. As can be seen in the Table below, every 
country has chosen a specific way of allocating the tax, the most interesting probably being that adopted 
by Denmark in which the level of the tax is varied according to the firm’s level of emissions.  
 
Table 1: The level and terms of the carbon tax in Europe 
Source (Harnay, Reme, 2012) 
 
Level of the tax Initial level Current level 
Sweden €27 in 1991 €108 in 2010 
Denmark Variable tax that depends on the firm’s level of emissions, about 
€12.50 in 2009 
Finland €1.20 in 1990 applied solely to 
transport and heating 
€20 in 2011 
Germany No specific price allocated to CO2, introduction of an ecotax of 
12.28 Euro cents per litre of fuel and 2 Euro cents per kWh in 1999 
United Kingdom The Climate Change Levy is applied to industry and commerce, but 
not households and only and not to coal. In 2011 the Levy stood at 
0.485p/kWh for electricity, 0.167p/kWh for gas and 0.07p/kWh for 
petrol. 
Norway In 1991, a maximum of 
approximately $40 per tonne 
Varies between $15 and $61 
according to the carbon content 
of the firm’s emissions and the 
sector. Manufacturing is largely 
exempted but Norway considers 
that the tax covers 64% of 
emissions. 
Proposal for France Addition of a strictly applied 
carbon tax of €17 per tonne of 
CO2 in 2010 
€100 in 2030 
 
Although there is a large difference between the French level of €17 for the carbon tax and the Swedish 
level of €108, France could very easily have introduced a low level tax and then raised it later.  
1.2. The compensation principle 
In addition to the level of the tax, the nature of the compensation principle that is applied is of 
fundamental importance in order to avoid reducing purchasing power or the competitiveness of economic 
actors.  
There were several possibilities with regard to the compensation process. For example, the tax could be 
refunded by green cheques, tax credits, direct partial refunding, or the reduction of certain social security 
contributions, etc.  
The French government settled on refunding by green cheques. This is an exceptional measure at 
European level, and was adopted in spite of the doubts expressed by experts, as can be seen in Table 2. 
Table 2: The compensation principle and energy taxation in European countries 
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Source (Harnay, Reme, 2012) 
 
Country Compensation principle Taxation system 
Sweden Reduction in the original 
energy tax, income tax for 
households and some social 
contributions on work. 
The carbon tax is part of a 
system that includes 3 other 
taxes (sulphur, nitrogen, 
energy). 
Denmark Income tax reduction and 
taxes on work  
A tax on petrol, coal, 
electricity and sulphur  
Finland Reduction in income tax and 
employers’ contributions for 
work  
An energy tax and a tax on oil 
products  
Germany Reduction in employees’ and 
employers’ contributions 
particularly for pensions  
Tax on oil products, tax on 
heavy, and light fuel oil, 
natural oils, and electricity 
(but not coal)  
United Kingdom Reduction in employers’ 
contributions for work 
Very high tax on oil products 
and a tax on electricity  
Proposal for France Tax credits or green cheques 
Tax on oil products for some 
sectors such as road freight 
transport, and on natural gas, 
electricity and coal (at a lower 
level).  
 
The experts at CIRED have shown that refunds by cheque would prevent the development of a “virtuous 
circle” which could initiate a recovery in the public finances. This is, in fact, what is usually referred to as 
a double dividend: apart from environmental benefits, the CCE could have positive economic impacts. 
Their macroeconomic models simulated the impact of a carbon tax on a variety of economic indicators 
(GDP, debt/GDP, household consumption, unemployment, etc.). According to them, in the long term, the 
double dividend would hardly seem achievable:  
“The central issue is the tension between the short and long terms: the idea of a carbon tax was put 
forward in order to assist a revolution in our energy systems over two to three decades, but it is its 
immediate impacts which are potentially negative for consumers and industry. (…) Our simulation of the 
short-term effect of a €17 of €32 recycled tax under this extreme hypothesis reveals, if all revenues are 
recycled by means of green cheques, GDP losses of between 0.13% and 0.25%, accompanied by fairly 
similar job losses. (…) Taxing firms will increase their production costs, which will propagate from one 
sector to another, ultimately to be paid by consumers. But the amount they will pay is greater than might 
be thought simply because the propagation costs from one sector to another lead to a general increase in 
prices and the cheque received by consumers will not compensate for this. In addition, the loss of 
competitiveness will lead to an increase in unemployment and a reduction in average incomes” ([5], p12). 
To maximise the double dividend, CCE must be considered as the first stage in the implementation of a 
genuine carbon taxation system. This would require a reform of the taxation system which reduced 
employers’ contributions in order to increase environmental taxation. This would stimulate recruitment: 
“beyond a certain level, a carbon tax would automatically lead to a large-scale restructuring of mandatory 
levies. (…) It is by seeing the carbon tax as going hand in hand with a transformation of the entire system 
of mandatory levies that we will enable citizens and firms to face new challenges” ([5], p. 10).  
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The Rocard Commission envisaged other possibilities, pointing out that the benefits of the tax would be 
increased if a reduction in social security contributions was preferred to refunding by cheque. However it 
also stressed that this would require a modification of the French taxation system. 
This the French CCE did not do, but other European countries such as Sweden, Denmark and Finland 
have undertaken a stage by stage reform of their taxation system. As early as 1924, Sweden, for example, 
had an energy tax on petrol which it extended to diesel oil in 1937. In 1957 an energy tax on fossil fuels 
that was limited to mineral oils and coal was added, and the system was then extended again to include 
LPG in 1964 and natural gas in 1985. The levels of these energy taxes have been constantly increased 
since to reach a maximum level in 1990 (it was increased from 25 SEK/m3 to 960 SEK/m3 in 1990).  
 
The second stage was a major reform in the early 1990s. Sweden started to overhaul its tax system, 
introducing three additional taxes (on carbon, sulphur and nitrogen emissions) and lowering the energy 
tax described above, income tax for households and some social contributions for work ([27], p. 50). “ 
The introduction of the CO2 tax in 1991 was primarily aimed at cutting high income taxes. The reduction 
in income taxes amounted to a loss equivalent to approximately 4.6% of the GDP in that year,” ([27], p. 
51). 
 
Finally, in 2001 the process entered a new phase which involved an additional increase in the carbon tax 
and a further reduction in income tax. According to the Swedish Ministry of the Environment, “the CO2 
tax constitutes the most significant part of the excise duties levied on energy. In 2005, the CO2 tax 
constituted more than three-quarters of the total tax on fossil fuel consumption” ([28] p. 191,192). The 
idea was “to secure a reliable supply of energy and electricity while meeting national and international 
commitments to reduce emissions. The electricity generation mix in Sweden differs from the situation in 
neighbouring countries as Sweden relies heavily on hydropower and nuclear power” (Idem). 
According to the Swedish Ministry of the Environment, the success of the tax is very much linked to this 
reform of the taxation system.  
In most European countries, the carbon tax has been integrated within a complete overhaul of the taxation 
system, although there are differences between each country. The selected modes of compensation, and 
the exonerations that are granted reveal different and complex philosophies. Some countries, such as 
Sweden, prefer to grant exemptions to industry, others like the United Kingdom prefer to favour private 
individuals), or the classify firms as “major energy consumers to be exempted” (in this case Germany 
uses statistical categories and the United Kingdom considers whether the company comes under the 
Climate Change Agreement). Be this as it may, each country seems to have implemented the most 
favourable conditions for obtaining a double dividend while at the same time protecting the 
competitiveness of its national industries. Sweden and Finland favoured compensation based on a 
reduction of taxation on incomes or companies. Denmark and the United Kingdom have been even more 
encouraging by reducing employers’ social security contributions, and Germany and the Netherlands have 
combined the two approaches. 
The great majority of European countries that have introduced a carbon tax (or a similar levy) have 
decided to introduce compensation through a reduction in taxation on work, thus initiating a process of 
genuine fiscal reform. The proposed French legislation was quite different. It was a minimalist tax with a 
low level and compensation that was unlikely to have impacts. According to an OECD study performed 
by Stéphanie Jamet, the carbon tax is part of an overhauled taxation system in Sweden while “in France, 
the carbon tax was presented as an additional tax, which doubtless played a part to its failure”([16], p. 7). 
In fact, from the macroeconomic and environmental standpoints the tax would seem to have little to 
recommend it.  
1.3. The carbon tax applied to the French road haulage industry: an inept proposal  
According to the Rocard Report, carbon taxation in the transport sector could have been extremely 
beneficial “as demonstrated by the TIPP (Domestic Tax on Oil Products] which has meant that fuel 
consumption in France is three times lower than in the United States” ([26], p.6). Although the 
comparison did not take account of geographical and economic differences between the two countries, the 
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experts in the Rocard Commission stated that it “highlights the effectiveness of fiscal incentives”. The 
road hauliers’ associations did not, however, see it quite in this way. It is true that the fiscal compensation 
mechanisms for the tax which were proposed to the road haulage industry were at the very least open to 
criticism on the grounds of their complexity and the large number of modifications they underwent. 
 
- The first draft of 2 September 2009  
In the first draft of the 2010 Budget Framework Act, which was presented in September 2009, details of 
the implementation of the carbon tax were given in Article 5 which concerned the combined 
implementation of the CCE4 and the General Tax on Polluting Activities (TGAP).  
The CCE was to be levied on commercial vehicles of over 7.5 tonnes travelling in France and would 
amount to an increase in the price of diesel of 4.52 centimes per litre for road haulage firms, which would 
then be passed on (as far as possible) to shippers. The proposed refunding procedure was a reduction in 
the TIPP from €39.19 to € 34.67.  
The bill also explained that commercial vehicles of over 7.5 tonnes would be subject to a second levy, the 
General Tax on Polluting Activities (TGAP), which would be equal to the product of the volume of fuel 
consumed and the level of the carbon tax, i.e. €0.452. This means that the General Tax on Polluting 
Activities, which has existed since 1999 for a limited number of activities such as waste storage and 
disposal, aircraft take-offs from airfields that are open to the public etc., would be extended to the road 
haulage industry.  
The mechanism described in the Draft Act was therefore fairly complex and involved interdependency 
between the three taxes (the TGAP, TIPP and CCE). It would not be possible for both the TGAP and the 
CCE to be refunded. The system could not therefore be completely neutral from the fiscal standpoint. In 
response to this most unusual treatment, the federations of shippers and hauliers (TLF, FNTR, 
UNOSTRA, GFI, UIC, FIM, FCD, CGI, AUTF) formed an “anti-TGAP action group” which highlighted 
the contradictions within this double tax which was poorly compensated for by the reduction of a third. 
The unanimity among the members of this action group (carriers, the mass retail sector, shippers from the 
SME sector, etc.) should be highlighted. 
Apart from the fact that the road haulage industry was subjected to a double tax while the rest of the 
economy was only subjected to a single one, the action group in particular questioned the process of 
partial refunding on the grounds that “the lowering of the lowest rate of the TIPP which is used for the 
partial refunding of the carbon tax… does not comply with community law (Energy Directive of 27 
October 2003), which raises some doubts about whether the carbon tax would be refunded for 2010 and 
even greater ones for later years”(communiqué from the anti-TGAP action group, October 2009). It is 
true that the European Union had not ratified the possibility of a continual reduction in the TIPP.  
An amendment to Article 5, on 27th October 2009  
After several months of negotiations after the first announcement about Article 5, another measure was 
passed by Parliament which proposed to abolish the double tax procedure. The amendment overturned the 
introduction of a TGAP for transport and proposed a single carbon tax with partial refunding at a level of 
36%. The French Finance Ministry described this as “the gradual application of the carbon tax which in 
2010 will lead to an increase in the refunding of the current TIPP to a level of 36% of the carbon tax paid 
for in the diesel oil that is consumed. The rate of refunding will therefore change from € 39.19 to € 37.59 
per hectolitre.” The refunding procedure would therefore remain the same, involving a reduction in the 
TIPP.  
This new measure was still rejected by the federations of road hauliers5, as the level of refunding was far 
lower than the 75% granted to agriculture and fishing and the exemption granted to heavy industry as a 
result of the quota system6.  
                                                          
4 The Article is available at: 
 http://www.performance-publique.gouv.fr/fileadmin/medias/documents/ressources/PLF2010/PLF-
2010.pdf 
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A comprehensive compensatory budget in December 2009  
Last, in December 2009 doubtless in order to prevent a road haulier’s strike during the Christmas and 
New Year period and compensate for the future salary concessions demanded by the drivers’ unions, the 
Secretary of State for Transport proposed a partial exemption from the tax, amounting to about €100 
million out of a total tax take estimated at €400 million by the road haulage industry employers’ 
associations.  
The terms under which the carbon tax was implemented and refunded were thus changing continually 
during 2009 under the influence of various bodies representing drivers, haulage companies and shippers. 
In January 2010, the road haulage industry was therefore expected to pay the CCE, of which 36% was to 
be refunded, and receive an additional fixed sum of €100 million. The climate was more one of 
negotiations and adjustment as a result of a power struggle than the imposition of a tax that is refunded 
via reductions in national insurance contributions in order to obtain an economic dividend, as 
recommended in the Rocard Report. 
Table 3 below summarizes articles 5, 6 and 7 of the 2010 draft budget and their amendments. 
Table 3: The French draft legislation on the carbon tax and its amendment 
Source (Harnay, Reme, 2012) 
 
Sector Application Compensation 
Road haulage industry 
 First draft 
 Amendment 
 Second 
amendment 
Carbon tax and TGAP 
Carbon tax  
Carbon tax 
Reduction in the TIPP from €39.19 to €34.67 per 
hectolitre, no compensation in the case of the TGAP 
The reduction in the TIPP made it possible to refund 
35% of the carbon tax 
A payment of €100 million 
Agriculture Gradual introduction of 
a carbon tax over a five 
year period 
A direct credit of 75% 
Manufacturing  Exemption of those subjected to quotas, application in full for those not.  
Households Carbon Tax 
Green cheques or tax credits (the sums of €46 for a 
single person, €92€ for a jointly taxed couple, were 
increased to €61 and €122 respectively for tax payers 
living in a municipality that lies outside the zone 
covered by urban public transport). 
  
There is no doubt that the French government was very inept when drafting the proposals for the 2010 
Finance Act.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
5 Only the OTRE, the organization of European road hauliers, wished to maintain the double tax, 
considering in particular that the TGAP provided a means of taxing foreign firms, whereas the other 
federations took the view that it encouraged delocalization.  
6 The federations in question still criticized the fact that : “this amendment ignores vehicles of less than 
7.5 tonnes (…): as these have no right to a refund of the TIPP, they do not benefit from the tax reduction” 
(idem). 
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One can nevertheless ask whether adjustments could have enabled it to provide a useful price signal for 
modifying behaviours and reducing emissions.  
 
2. The example of the road haulage sector: could the carbon tax have reduced CO2 emissions? 
The case of the road haulage industry is particularly informative with regard to the issues surrounding the 
introduction of carbon taxation. As it is perceived as one of the sectors which pollute the most, and 
stigmatized as such, it was explicitly targeted by the French CCE 
The experts who were given the task of preparing the draft legislation recommended giving the road 
haulage industry preferential treatment. 
For its simulation concerning the transport sector, CIRED decided to start with a tax of €100 per tonne. 
The simulation showed that this would increase the sector’s costs. The economists who carried out this 
work concluded that road haulage needed specific measures:  
“The industries which are carbon intensive and vulnerable are above all liable to suffer as a 
result of the reform due to a reduction in their margins. In the case of a unilateral measure, in a 
world where capital circulates freely, the scale of the reduction in their profits may threaten their 
immediate survival, or at least their modernization, including their ability to reinvest in low 
carbon technologies. Rather than exempting them from the tax, the solution is to grant them an 
allowance based on their carbon use and their capital intensity” ([6] p. 4). 
In Sweden, transport is also perceived as being dependent on the use of fossil fuel. In the preparation for 
the 2008 budget, which increased the taxation on carbon and diesel oil, it is, for example, described as 
“responsible for 30% of emissions”. 
However, Sweden does not seem to consider the road haulage industry to be a particularly vulnerable 
sector. 
The experience of various European countries is now sufficient to allow us to assess the interest of the 
carbon tax in the case of the road haulage industry.  
In France, the federations of road hauliers were strongly opposed to the tax and formed a defence 
committee. Were they right? We can ask whether the French road haulage industry constitutes a specific 
case. Is it, for example, already sufficiently taxed to reduce CO2 emissions? (2.1) Would the 
competitiveness of the French road haulage industry be particularly affected? (2.2) Was the rejection of 
the CEE in France justified on the grounds that its high implementation cost would be responsible for a 
degree of inefficiency (2.3)? 
2.1 Road haulage: a sector that has made considerable efforts with regard to the environment  
The table 4 below shows that while CO2 emissions from road transport rose by 14.7% between 1990 and 
2000 they have decreased since 2005. This is doubtless due to the considerable efforts made by the road 
haulage sector since 2005.  
Table 4: CO2 emissions from transport in France (including overseas Départements, Mt CO2) 
Source CITEPA, Juin 2009 
 
Transport mode 1990 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1990 /2007 
Air 4.2 6.2 5.1 5.1 5.0 4.7 4.6 +7% 
Road 110.7 127.0 130.8 131.0 129.5 128.8 127.4 +15% 
Rail 1.1 10.8 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.5 -47% 
Sea 1.7 1.6 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.7 3.0 +77% 
Other 0.2 0.5 0.7 0.8 1.0 0.6 0.6 *2.6 
Total 117.9 136.0 139.6 140.1 138.6 137.4 136.0 +15% 
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The introduction of technical standards for HGVs has been an extremely effective measure. The 
successive introduction from 1988 of the Euro standards 0, I, II, III and IV culminating in 2009 with Euro 
Standard V – which limits hydrocarbon emissions to 0.13g/kWh, carbon monoxide emissions to 1.5 
g/tonne-kilometre, nitrogen oxide emissions to 0.4 g/ tonne kilometre – has reduced sulphur emissions by 
99% (source FNTR – National Federation of Road Hauliers [12]), carbon monoxide emissions by 64% – 
idem), nitrogen oxide emissions by 49% and particulate emissions by 61% since 1990 [8]. According to 
ADEME (the French Environment and Energy Management Agency), the French fleet has made 
enormous progress as regards pollution: an HGV with a total authorized loaded weight of 40 tonnes 
consumed 34 litres per 100km in 2010, compared with 50 litres in 1970.  
Furthermore the increase in the number of vehicle kilometres (apart from in 2009 because of the 
economic crisis) shows that the amount of activity has not diminished since the 1990s, as can be seen 
from Table 5. There seems therefore to have been a real reduction in pollution.  
Table 5: Freight transport traffic (Mtkm) 
Source sitram, SOES 
Transport mode 1990       2001 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 
Rail  28,958   29,874 27,795 26,572 23,518 24,569 25,192 22,571 
Waterways  4,267       3,594 4,021 4,163 4,640 4,645 4,377 4,783 
Road (third 
party) 70,058   138,255 139,431 148,858 147,214 150,843 161,471 128,710 
Route (own 
account) 27,962    30,401 31,726 30,386 30,233 31,989 30,036 27,344 
Total for 
metroplitan 
France 131,245 202,124 202,973 209,979 205,605 212,046 221,076 183,408 
 
The Domestic Tax on Oil Products (TIPP) targets the use of oil as a motor fuel and is collected according 
to the amounts used. Its level depends on the nature of the oil product7. After refunding8, the level of the 
TIPP is €39.19 per hectolitre. According to MEEDDAT [18,19], “it accounts for 11.1% of the total cost 
of transport” and sets out to achieve a reduction in the use of oil products and more economical fuel use. 
Therefore, the TIPP is already an indirect tax on CO2 emissions because, as stated by ADEME, “burning 
a litre of diesel oil leads to the emission of 2.662 kg of CO2”. 
Another tax, the mileage tax on commercial vehicles weighing over 3.5 tonnes (which has recently been 
renamed the “green tax”), was proposed in 2009 for implementation in 2011. Its level varies between 2.5 
and 20 centimes per kilometre, depending on the vehicle’s EURO class. It would apply to a network of 
10,000km of non conceded roads, and a few routes on the French road network. Like the CCE and the 
TIPP, this tax aims to encourage modal transfers9. It was trialled in Alsace in 2010 and met with strong 
opposition from road hauliers who perceived it as a way for the government to recover revenue it had lost 
as a result of the privatization of motorways. In particular, the tax was criticized as unfair to some regions 
(such as Brittany where the network is almost free) which would be highly taxed, as well as to French 
hauliers as foreign trucks use motorways more. In this case too, the French government retreated and on 
19 April 2010, the Minister for Transport delayed the implementation of this mileage tax for HGVs until 
the second half of 2012 on the grounds of its technical complexity. This was in spite of the fact that the 
tax was expected to bring about a reduction in CO2 emissions of between 350 and 500 thousand tonnes.  
                                                          
7For example, it is higher on premium grade petrol (€0.6069 per litre) than diesel oil (€0.4284 per litre). 
8This tax is partially refunded by the customs office to which the firm makes a declaration (approximately 
€2.5 to €3.5 per hectolitre). 
9The revenue from this green tax has been evaluated by the Ministry of Infrastructure at €860 million. 
This sum should be used to finance infrastructure the nature of which is not specified, except that it 
should be compatible with the policy of modal transfer away from the road.  
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According to the Comité National Routier (CNR), taxes that are linked to energy consumption (i.e. 
currently only the TIPP) account for a large proportion of road haulage firms’ costs. In the case of a 40 
tonne articulated vehicle combination carrying various types of freight, the CNR cost reference for long 
distance transport breaks down as follows [11]: 
Diesel oil exclusive of tax 11.3% 
TIPP 11.1% 
Axle tax 0.4% 
Tolls 5.7 
Maintenance 8.4% 
Equipment 13.2% 
Wages and social charges 29.4% 
Travel expenses 6.4% 
Fixed charges 14.1% 
It is therefore the TIPP which leads hauliers to argue that they already pay a pollution tax. But although 
there is only one oil tax, it represents a significant percentage of the costs borne by the road haulage 
industry10.  
In addition, according to ADEME, the French TIPP is “equivalent to a tax of €265 per tonne of CO2 on 
premium grade unleaded petrol and €158 per tonne of CO2 on diesel” ([2], p. 2).  
More generally, ADEME estimates that “overall, in France, the level of carbon taxation is higher than the 
European average: the implicit tax on one tonne of carbon in France stands at €64, while the European 
average is €47” ([2], p. 1). This argument gives the impression that there is no point in making the users 
of petroleum fuels pay an additional tax11. 
 
However, a closer examination of ADEME’s work shows that this would be an over-hasty conclusion. 
The agency also states that “as a percentage of GDP, the level of French energy taxation is one of the 
lowest in Europe. According to Eurostat, in 2006, French excise duties levied on energy stood at 1.35% of 
GDP and 2.7% of public expenditure, compared with 1.5% and 3.3% respectively in the 25-member 
European Union” ([2], p. 4) as shown in Graph 1: 
 
Graph 1: Energy taxation as a percentage of GDP and government revenue (2006)  
Source : ADEME and Eurostat 2009 
 
                                                          
10We should also mention other measures which combat CO2 emissions. The “CO2 charter” brought in by 
the MEEDDAT in 2007 in order to meet the country’s undertakings under the Kyoto protocol, i.e. not to 
emit more greenhouse gases in 2012 than in 1990. It had been signed by 10 road haulage companies in 
2008 (including Chronopost, Geodis and Dentressangle), but has been signed by many more companies 
since the abandonment of the carbon tax, as though road haulage firms felt that they ought to choose their 
manner of participating in carbon emissions reductions themselves.  
The energy savings certificates that were introduced in 2005 make it compulsory to make energy savings 
during a given period or face a fine (energy savings could be made by using special tyres, training drivers 
in economically driving techniques, using environmentally-friendly materials in road haulage company 
premises, etc.). They attracted relatively little participation, and according to the Ministry, the road 
haulage industry accounted for only 0.3% of certificate holders, most of the firms involved belonging to 
the construction sector. 
11 The conclusions are not unequivocal even for experts. For example, the Rocard report states the 
following: “Some take the view that part of existing taxation should be considered already to take account 
of the cost of CO2 emissions. The CCE should therefore not be added to existing taxation, existing 
taxation should simply be redeployed with reference to the different types of external effects for different 
types of transport, trips and (…) vehicles. Others consider that when these externalities are analyzed, it is 
apparent that, overall, the amount allowed for them is approximately €9 billion too little– particularly in 
the case of urban transport. Furthermore, the transport sector must participate in the large emissions 
reductions that will have to be made between now and 2020 and 2050” ([26] p. 26).   
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The introduction of a Climate and Energy Tax would allow France to reach the average in the rest of 
Europe average (idem)12, in particular countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark and 
Sweden who introduced carbon taxes in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Of course, the road haulage industry is already taxed in France, in particular via the TIPP, but the amount 
has to be put in relation to national GDP. 
The taxation that is applied to the road haulage industry also has to be put in comparison to many other 
European countries such as Sweden, where we have seen above the number of energy taxes that are 
levied on firms and households. 
If we take the case of Sweden which has an equivalent of the French TIPP, the petrol tax was the first 
energy tax to be introduced, in the 1920s, at a rate of 0.05 SEK per litre. This is now included in the 1991 
system by means of the four taxes we have described above. According to Speck, “Companies are not 
given a rebate on the CO2 tax when the fuel is used for transportation purposes” ([28] p. 197). It follows 
that unleaded premium petrol, premium petrol and diesel oil are taxed at the rates set out in Table 6 drawn 
up by Speck (idem p. 197) which summarizes a large body of data provided by the IAE:  
 
Table 6: Rates of tax for transport fuels in Sweden (Euro cents/litre) 
 
  1985 1990 1996 2000 2002 2005 
Unleaded 
petrol 1 
Energy tax 
CO2 tax 
  
 
38.76 
10.10 
42.75 
10.18 
34.49 
15.94 
31.59 
23.58 
                                                          
12 ADEME considers that this is largely explained by the fact that “France has a relatively high rate of 
taxation for motor fuel, while fossil products that are used as heating fuel are taxed at a low rate. For 
example, the CO2 that is produced by burning petrol is taxed at a high rate (€265 per tonne while the 
average for the 27-member EU is €214). However, a low rate of taxation is applied to heavy fuel oil (€6 
per tonne, compared to an average figure of €15) and the rate of tax in France for domestic fuel oil is half 
the European average domestic fuel oil” ([2], p. 1). 
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Total tax 39.62 48.86 52.93 50.43 55.18 
Unleaded 
petrol 2 
Energy tax 
CO2 tax 
Total tax 
  
 
39.62 
39.46 
10.10 
49.56 
43.10 
10.18 
53 .28 
34.82 
15.94 
50.76 
31.93 
23.58 
55.51 
Other  
petrol 
leaded 
Energy tax 
CO2 tax 
Total tax 
 
 
35.73  
 
 
42.02 
45.80 
10.10 
55.90 
50.56 
10.18 
60.74 
41.92 
15.94 
57.85 
39.38 
23.58 
62.97 
Diesel 113 Energy tax 
CO2 tax 
Total tax 
6.29 
 
6.29 
12.77 
 
12.77 
17.38 
12.33 
29.71 
22.02 
12.55 
34.58 
14.41 
19.65 
34.06 
11.57 
29.04 
40.60 
Diesel 2 Energy tax 
CO2 tax 
Total tax 
6.29 
 
6.29 
12.77 
 
12.77 
19.73 
12.33 
32.06 
24.75 
12.55 
37.30 
17.03 
19.65 
36.68 
14.24 
29.04 
43.27 
Diesel 3 Energy tax 
CO2 tax 
Total tax 
6.29 
 
6.29 
12.77 
 
12.77 
22.90 
12.33 
35.23 
28.18 
12.55 
40.73 
20.41 
19.65 
40.06 
17.80 
29.04 
46.83 
 
The road haulage industry does not, therefore, receive special treatment in Sweden with regard to the 
carbon tax even though it is responsible for 24% of total energy consumption (IAE, 2008). In Sweden 
“reducing the emissions by 15% from 2005 to 2025 is seen as possible, even after increases in freight 
transport volumes” (idem). However, other sectors benefit from a lower rate (21% of that applied to 
consumers), and heavy industry which is subject to the quota pays an even lower rate (15%), as can be 
seen in Table 7: 
 
Table 7: Exemptions from the energy taxation as at 1 January 2007 
Source: IEA, 2008 
 
Sector Payable share of CO2 tax, % Payable share of excise tax, % 
Services and households 100 100 
Heat production 100 0 
Heat in industrial processes 21 0 
Heat production in highly efficient 
combined heat and power plants  
21 0 
Industrial boilers 21 0 
Manufacturing  21 0 
Farming, aquaculture, forestry 21 0 
Horticulture 21 0 
Electricity production 0 0 
                                                          
13 The distinction between the three types of diesel were made by the Swedish authorities on the basis of 
environmental characteristics such as the fuel’s sulphur content. 
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The road haulage industry is not more protected with respect to carbon taxation in Sweden than in France. 
It is manufacturing which benefits from rebates. In Finland, the carbon tax is only levied on transport and 
heating, so the question of exemptions for transport does not arise. Are there any other reasons for 
protecting the road transport industry from a carbon tax in France? 
 
2.2. Rejection on the grounds that the tax would harm the competitiveness of 
French firms compared to European ones? 
While the political context in terms of regional elections and the decision of the Constitutional Council 
was unfavourable to the introduction of the CCE in France, the most frequently quoted reason for 
rejecting it was that it would harm the competitiveness of French firms. This argument was also directly 
stated in all European countries. The Danish author Mikael Skou Andersen and the British author Paul 
Ekins have produced an analysis of the different carbon emissions taxes in the European community, 
attempting to evaluate their impact on the productivity and competitiveness of firms in a book entitled 
Carbon Energy Taxation: Lessons from Europe.  
According to Andersen and Ekins, it is obvious that the introduction of a new tax may impair the 
competitiveness of the affected companies, although it is necessary to take account of the economic and 
regulatory context in which they operate: “There is no doubt that carbon energy taxes can have an impact 
on the competitiveness of energy intensive industries, although competitiveness is dependent on factors 
other than just carbon energy taxes. First, (..) energy import prices and transmission and distribution 
tariffs (natural gas and electricity) as well as exchange rate variations have some significance in this 
discussion. Secondly, non-price factors such as production methods, infrastructure and education are also 
important. Thirdly and finally, the energy tax burden versus the recycling measure introduced as part of 
an environmental tax reform is a significant factor” ([3], p. 49).  
But these authors also mentioned Porter’s hypothesis which maintains that if an environmental tax 
impairs the competitiveness of firms in the short term, it can nevertheless still have positive economic 
impacts: “high national environmental standards will encourage domestic industries to innovate and 
hence improve competitiveness, in particular when the regulatory standards anticipate requirements that 
will spread internationally (Porter 1990)” in ([3], p. 100). 
In fact, this hypothesis suggests that an increase in the price of the input used to fix the tax will encourage 
firms to replace this input with others which consume less energy or to innovate in order to minimize the 
use of the input in question. And “this may stimulate growth either because demand for the specific 
industrial products increases, or because initiatives help to create a strong green image, which improves 
general economic conditions for the firm (...) but this is difficult to observe and measure” [4] p. 104). 
In an attempt to test “Porter’s hypothesis”, Andersen, Enevoldsen and Ryelund studied a panel of 56 
industrial sectors – which did not include transport – in Europe in the period 1990-2003. To this end, they 
used unit energy cost and the cost of labour as competitiveness indicators. They concluded that an 
increase in energy prices led to only a very slight increase in these two types of costs, and the 
competitiveness of firms was affected even less ([4], p. 115).  
 
Andersen and Ekins’ study makes considerable use of the results given by the E3ME (Energy-
Environment Economy model for Europe) developed by the consultancy Cambridge Econometrics which 
sets out to compare the long- and short-term impacts of the carbon tax on the European economy. This 
model is very complex because it must take account of a high degree of diversity within Europe: all 
countries have not made the same decisions with regard to the level of the tax, the industries it targets and 
the compensation mechanism that is applied. In some countries, the introduction of the tax led to an 
overhaul of the entire tax system, in the case of others it replaced an existing tax, etc. One quality of the 
model is that it is multisectoral and dynamic - it functions as an input/output model constructed using 
Eurostat and OECD databases.  
 
The authors nevertheless highlight that the introduction of a carbon tax leads to:  
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- a reduction in fuel demand: this is very high in the case of Sweden and Finland, but lower in the 
case of the others  
-  a reduction in CO2 emissions which almost completely mirrors the reduction in fuel demand,  
- a rise in GDP in the long term.  
- an increase in the number of jobs in the case where employers’ contributions are lowered as a 
compensation mechanism, i.e. in Denmark and Germany. Surprisingly, the model also predicts 
an increase in the number of jobs in Sweden where this decision was not made, no doubt due to 
the increase in GDP which is forecast in the long term.  
Next, in order to measure the impact on productivity, the authors of the study examined imports and 
exports:  
- for exports, the tax appears to have little effect except in the case of Denmark and the 
Netherlands where they would increase due to a reduction in employers’ contribution. 
- for imports, the simulation shows an increase which is clear in the case of Sweden, but less so 
for other countries.  
 
It should be noted that the study included little simulation on road freight transport as such. For this 
sector, the authors forecast a slight increase in prices in the case of Finland and a short-term rise followed 
by a longer-term price reduction in the case of Sweden.  
It is therefore difficult to reach a definitive conclusion as regards the road haulage industry. In France, the 
simulations conducted by the CIRED team with regard to road transport do not give a better estimate of 
the changes in competitiveness which would have resulted from the CCE. Based on a level of taxation of 
€100 per tonne and the economic conditions which pertained in 2004, the hypotheses used in the 
simulation are too far removed from the current economic situation.  
In order to assess whether the competitiveness of road haulage firms has been affected, we finally only 
have partial answers based on estimates of economic aggregates made by various institutions and the 
statements of carriers.   
Nobody can deny the difficulties that the French and global economies have faced since 2008. According 
to the OECD, French GDP has risen more slowly since 2008, and GDP even fell in the second quarter of 
that year (-1.5% in the third and fourth quarters), although it started to rise again in the second quarter of 
2009 (OECD, 17 February 2010). GDPs have been falling in a similar way all over the world (with 
highest drop being 6.12% in the second quarter of 2009 in Sweden according to the OECD, 29 July 
2010). The competitiveness of other European countries is therefore suffering as much as France’s.  
The study conducted by the Ministry of the crisis and competition within the European road haulage 
industry in 2008 provides us with some partial answers in this area. This analysis concluded that “the 
French road haulage industry carries half a percentage point less of all European freight” and road 
haulage activity in Metropolitan France has fallen by 5% “much more than the average for national 
carriers (1.9%).” According to the Comité National Routier, in 2010, French carriers are “the least active 
as regards cabotage activities in Western Europe. The volume of cabotage has significantly fallen in the 
last five years for Belgian and French hauliers, while those from Germany, Luxembourg, Spain and Italy 
have increased their cabotage activities” [10]. It is true that in the last ten years, the competitiveness of 
the French haulage industry seems to be falling compared with the rest of Europe [1] but the global 
economic crisis can hardly be blamed for this state of affairs. “In 2003, cabotage activities conducted by 
French hauliers amounted to 14.4% of the cabotage activities conducted by foreign hauliers in France. In 
2008, this level had fallen to 7.6%” ([10]). The French road haulage sector seems to have been weak for 
many years [9].  
In a study conducted in September 2009, the Industrial Vehicle Observatory (Observatoire du Véhicule 
Industriel − OVI) concluded that “French road haulage […] should beware of competition from 
aggressive European road hauliers, in particular from Eastern and Southern Europe” ([24], p 8). In the 
view of the OVI, the danger is still present, and is mainly due to the taxation system: “new taxes will 
cause problems for road transport (road charges for HGVs, carbon taxation)”.  
2.3. A questioning of the incentive principle 
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In France, while it would no doubt have been better to devise a system that was less complex and more 
equitable, the most important questions concern its efficiency. In our view, the taxation system that 
applies to the road haulage industry and the sector-based application of the carbon tax do not constitute 
convincing arguments for its withdrawal.  
The goals derived from the Grenelle Environment Summit and enshrined in the Act of 3rd August 2009 
are as follows: “it is a priority to develop the use of river transport, rail transport and maritime transport, 
in particular short sea transport. The aim is to increase the modal share of non-road and non-air transport 
from 14 to 25% by 2022.” Could we expect the Climate and Energy Tax (CCE) to bring this about?  
Accurate simulation in this area is impossible. But the forecasts are not very optimistic because of cultural 
traditions, economic constraints, the flexibility of road transport and geographic inequalities between 
regions. The example of the mileage tax shows this well: the request was made to modulate this tax for 
Brittany, partly because modal transfer is virtually impossible. Neither rail transport nor river transport 
could take the place of road transport, at least not in the immediate future.  
The expectations of shippers appear to confirm the limits of future modal transfer. A survey conducted in 
2009 by the Regional Observatory of the Economy and the Region (Observatoire Régional de l’Économie 
et des Territoires) at the Nord-Pas de Calais Chamber of Commerce and Industry polled 5,500 regional 
firms in the industrial, construction, wholesale trading, retail distribution and logistics sectors on their 
forecasts regarding modal choice. Today, road transport is the principal mode used by these shippers and 
only 11% of them use river transport or rail transport in addition or as an alternative to it. When listing the 
benefits of road transport compared to another mode, the surveyed shippers only put price in fourth 
position, after speed, responsiveness and reliability. Therefore, with or without the tax, 71% of the 
respondents do not envisage changing the transport mode they use [24]. They would simply group their 
consignments together more and use foreign hauliers. The president of the Freight Transport Users 
Association (AUTF) confirmed the answers given by the firms in question: “Straightforward taxation will 
not at all make shippers move away from road transport. (…) Any company would be willing to switch to 
other modes if all those involved in its sector (suppliers, competitors and clients) operated in a fully 
integrated system. (…) For this to happen, all the States in the world would have to impose taxation on 
non-renewable energies” ([22] and [23]). 
In Sweden, although the Ministry is very pleased about the success of the tax, it has actually had much 
more impact on households than firms. It has not therefore been a total success. According to Johansson, 
it has had a smaller effect on the behaviour of firms because “a lower level of tax applies to industry than 
to households and for many industrial firms, energy costs account for a relatively small proportion of their 
total costs and are not therefore a high priority” ([20] p. 2) 
Furthermore, according to an OECD study by Stephanie JAMET, while it is true that CO2 emissions have 
fallen in Sweden as a result of the carbon tax in the energy supply and waste sectors “they have continued 
to increase in the transport sector” ([16], p. 9) as shown by Graphs 2 and 3: 
 
Graph 2: GHG emissions by sector in Sweden, 1990 to 2008 
 (Swedish Ministry of the Environment, 2009) 
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This increase in partly due to the increase in the volume of transport activities. Eurostat data report that 
freight transport in Sweden (by rail, road and waterways) increased by 17% in tonne-kilometre terms 
between 2000 and 2008. Passenger transport increased little over the same period. This puts the increase 
in total greenhouse gas emissions into perspective. However, the modal shares of rail road and waterways 
transport have hardly changed in 11 years, remaining at around 65% for the road. The carbon tax has 
therefore not encouraged modal transfers.  
 
Graph 3: Share of GHG emissions in Sweden by sector in 2007  
(Swedish Ministry of the Environment, 2009) 
 
Of course, the carbon tax may of course have had an impact, but only a minor one. Although we are 
unable to break down the data for road transport, the fact that the Swedish Ministry of the Environment 
has reached these conclusions shows the very high cost of reducing transport sector CO2 emissions in 
relation to the modest environmental gains. The question of how effective it would be with regard to the 
French road haulage sector therefore remains completely unresolved. 
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In Germany, the implementation of the carbon tax does not seem to have been particularly successful. Not 
many figures are available for us to judge its relative effectiveness, as the Environment Ministry prefers 
to say nothing. In 2003, the Minister simply mentioned that diesel oil accounted for a larger share of total 
fuel consumption than previously and that there had been no change in the volume of road traffic as a 
result of the tax.  
No doubt as a consequence of the expected relative efficiency of the carbon tax, the unfavourable 
treatment meted out to the road haulage industry and the major disparities with the recommendations of 
the Rocard Report, the introduction of the new carbon taxation was little understood by the road haulage 
sector as a whole.  
It even seemed that the French road haulage industry was being treated unfairly in comparison to 
agriculture and heavy industry. Should the industry have been considered as a particularly fragile sector 
that merited exemption as has been the case with other sectors in Europe? 
Sweden, for example, protects its industry with a lower level of carbon tax and applies discretionary 
compensation to those firms for which the tax would amount to a high percentage of sales (there are only 
a few of these). Germany and the United Kingdom exonerate some highly energy intensive firms from the 
tax; the first by statistical selection on the basis of voluntary reduction agreements, the second via the EU 
Integrated Pollution and Prevention Control Directive ([3], p. 48). 
In France, the Constitutional Council finally condemned the CCE on 29 December 2009, mainly on the 
grounds of the excessive exemptions granted to heavy industry: “thermal power stations that produce 
electricity, the emissions of the 1018 most polluting industrial sites such as refineries, cement factories, 
coking plants, glass factories, the energy intensive parts of the chemical industry, etc. are completely 
exonerated from the CCE” (Décision du Conseil Constitutionnel, Article 80). The Constitutional Council 
noted that although these industries are subjected to the quota market, quotas will continue to be 
distributed free of charge until 2013. In the Council’s view, the draft legislation on the Climate and 
Energy Tax was presented in such a way that “93% of industrial carbon dioxide emissions other that those 
from fuel will be completely exempted from the carbon contribution” (Article 82).  
 
CONCLUSION 
Since the 1990s, a number of European countries have decided to introduce a carbon tax. The success of 
the tax is difficult to estimate and the verdict one reaches depends on the point of view one adopts. For 
those countries which envisaged fiscal reform with a reduction in employers’ contributions, the tax 
represents a not insignificant step towards carbon-based taxation and the fiscal reform has been a success. 
With regard to changing behaviours, the carbon tax seems to have acted as a disincentive to household 
consumption of goods that use carbon and to have encouraged innovation in some sectors (for example 
the case of biomass in Sweden). However, it is not possible to draw genuinely positive conclusions with 
regard to road freight transport either in terms of modal transfer or traffic reductions.  
 
In recent years, the road transport sector has become cleaner throughout Europe as a result of the 
improvement of vehicle technologies and awareness of green driving practices. But the carbon tax does 
not seem to have had a decisive impact on the development of transport modes that provide an alternative 
to the road. Has it, however, adversely affected the competitiveness of the firms in the sector? Here too, it 
is difficult to reach a conclusion based on the estimations that have been made for European countries. 
Nevertheless, it is the fear of a reduction in their competitiveness that French road hauliers have 
expressed through their federations.  
 
It must be said that the carbon tax as it was proposed in the French 2010 Draft Finance Act for road 
freight transport rightly raised doubts within the sector. As we have seen, its level was much lower than 
the “environmentally efficient” level recommended by the Quinet and Rocard Commissions and the 
simulations conducted by the DGTPE and the CIRED. The refunding mechanisms (through tax credits, 
green cheques, direct partial refunding without a reduction in other levies) also gave the impression that 
the expected economic results (the double dividend) could not reach those in the aforementioned 
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simulations. Last, inequalities with regard to this tax for carriers with vehicles of less than 3.5 tonnes, for 
some sectors as opposed to others (such as agriculture and fishing which benefited from high rates of 
refunding or heavy industry which would be exempt because of quotas) infringe the principle of equity 
with regard to taxation. These are without doubt the reasons responsible for its deferment, modification or 
withdrawal.  
 
Moreover, the carbon tax was proposed during an economic crisis which had a major impact on the 
French road haulage industry and experts were concerned about the reduction in the competitiveness of 
French carriers. This has been extensively analyzed in the CNR studies, the report by Claude Abraham 
[1]. These studies see the issue of competitiveness as taking a specific form in France, as France is 
subjected to particularly severe competition, as it is one of the countries in Europe, if not the country in 
Europe, in which foreign hauliers are the most active. In particular, the Act of 1 May 2009 extended road 
cabotage allowing seven new countries from Eastern Europe to operate within France, namely Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.  
 
If there were to be a carbon tax in France, we therefore consider that it would be necessary to take the full 
measure of the accompanying fiscal reforms by proposing a higher level of the tax, and privileging a 
compensation processes based on the reduction of others taxes (on labor for example).  
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